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BOOK REVIEWS
SOURCES

OF

LAW.

By Helen Silving. Buffalo: William S. Hein

& Co., Inc., 1968. Pp. viii, 404. $20.00.
"Sources of Law" is a term of many meanings. For Coke it
signified the ancient books of the common law. For the draftsmen of
the Restatement of Restitution it meant "certain basic assumptions in
regard to what is required by justice in the various situations." ' Chief
Justice Stone, before he went on the bench, urged thiat legal education
be brought closer to the social factors, to the "energizing forces"
which are constantly remaking the body of the law. 2 Justice
Frankfurter has told somewhere of his own answer to a question he
would put to law students on what man of the past two centuries had
the greatest influence on law. His answer was James Watt who, by the
invention of a practicable steam engine and its substitution of
molecular power for muscular power in industry, made possible the
first Industrial Revolution with the consequent transformation of
society and law.
This book stresses yet another kind of source, assumptions of
legal philosophy which guide their uncritical or even unperceiving
adherents. On the importance of these assumptions, the book quotes a
discerning judge:
You remember Moliere's Jourdain who was surprised to learn that all his life he,

like literary men, had been talking 'prose'. So it is with 'practical lawyers' who
regard legal theory as a frivolous subject unworthy of their attention. In reality
these 'practical lawyers' are legal philosophers, but their philosophies, their
theories, are 'inarticulate'; and, therefore, they are more likely to do harm than
their colleagues who are more conscious of their . . . theories (p. 204 n.80).

Made up of selected articles originally published in law reviews,
the book discusses: the origin of the rule of law; several aspects of the
formal materials with which lawyers are accustomed to deal, such as
statutes, precedents and legal doctrine; and some philosophies of law,
especially natural law and positive law. Two matters mentioned are of
particular interest. One is concerned with whether judges only declare
law or whether they make it. Even in a civil law country such as
Germany, the author points out that the courts, employing the fine
I. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, ch. 1, topic I, Introductory Note at 11 (1937).
2. Stone, Tie Future oJ Legal Education, 10 A.B.A.J. 233, 234 (1924).
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contrasting terms "legal creativity" and "legal security," have held
that on appropriate matters they have the authority and, indeed, the
duty to make law (pp. 88-92). The Supreme Court of the United
States discussed the question directly in Linkletter v. Walker, which
involved the question whether the constitutional principle of Mapp v.
Ohio,4 regarding the exclusion by state courts of evidence wrongfully
seized, should be applied retroactively. Seemingly the Justices, though
divided in decision, were unanimous in the view that judges do make
law and that they could direct their consideration to what fairness and
wisdom required. Similar were the opinions of the Supreme Court of
Illinois in a recent case which involved the question of whether the
court, which had created the rule of contributory negligence, should
substitute the rule of comparative negligence, or whether so great a
change should be left to consideration by the legislature.5 Again
seemingly the justices agreed that they had the power to unmake what
they had made, and the difference in decision was over the value of
the principle of stare decisis as to this matter.
The book is dedicated to Professor Hans Kelsen of the "Pure
Theory of Law." The introduction brackets him with his apparent
philosophical opposite, Justice Holmes, for his similar ability to
clarify real issues:
Proceeding from epistemologically quite different premises, Justice
Holmes peculiar as this may seem-in large measure fulfilled a similar critical
jurisprudential task as did Kelsen. He freed legal thought of sham issues (p. 4).

Yet the author takes sharp issue with Justice Holmes' theory of law.
The theory was taken over by Justice Brandeis and used as one of the
foundations of the decision in the Erie case,' with its rejection of the
7
misnamed federal common law of Justice Story in Swijt v. Tyson.
Justice Holmes' theory of power as the basis of law-physical
power, governmental power, conceptual power-led him to grave
errors in conflict of laws. The theory was derived, it is believed, from
his trying experiences in the army in the Civil War.8 If theory not
3. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
4. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
5. Maki v. I-relk, 85 III. App. 2d 439, 229 N.E.2d 284 (1967). For a full discussion, see
Symposium: Comments on Maki v. Frelk-Comparative v. Contributory Negligence:Should the
Court or Legi.atture Decide? 21 \A,',D. L. REv. 889 (1968).

6. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
7. 41 U.S. 1(1842).
8. Reiblich, I/he
Conflict ot Law.%Philosophy oJ Air. Justice Hohnes, 28 Gi~o. L.J. I,2-23
(1939); Address by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Meeting Called by the Graudating Class of Harvard
University, May 30, 1895, in 0. HOLMES, SPEECHES 56 (1913).
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critically re-examined can mislead so great a man-a man ordinarily
so sceptical and critical-it" behooves all men of law to re-examine
their dearly held theories with all the aid they can find. This acute and
learned book gives such aid.
ELLIOT

E.

CHEATHAM*

9. *'The lire of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the
time, the prevalent moral and" political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or
unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellowmen, have had a good deal
more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed." 0.
HOLMI:S. TiH CONINON LAW I (1881).
* Research Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.

By Judson A. Crane & Alan R. Bromberg. St.
Paul: West Publishing Co., 1968. Pp. xviii, 615. $12.00.

LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

This book is a successor to the familiar hornbook on the law of
partnership by the late Professor Judson Crane. The bulk of the text
has been prepared by Professor Bromberg of Southern Methodist
University, who had originally agreed to collaborate with Professor
Crane as co-author and who completed the task independently
following Professor Crane's death. Professor Bromberg is to be
commended for having done a solid workmanlike job.
The law of partnership has received relatively little attention in
published works in recent years. Rowley on Partnership, Willis's
Handbook on Partnership Taxation, and the brief monographs in the
series published by the ABA-ALI Committee on Continuing Legal
Education are the only widely distributed recent contributions to the
literature of partnership law. For this reason, Professor Bromberg's
book is likely to reach a wider audience than might otherwise be
expected for a hornbook. Practitioners as well as students will find it a
more comprehensive text on the subject than a legal encyclopedia, and
it will provide a perspective different from that in Rowley. One is
therefore inclined to view this book somewhat more critically than
would be the case with works in fields in which a wider variety of
current literature is available.
Readers familiar with the first two editions of Crane on
Partnership will recognize in this book the basic structure of the
earlier volume. The first section, chapters one through three, is
concerned with the nature of the partnership, its formation, and
comparisons between partnership and other forms of business
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association. Chapters tour tnrough seven deal chiefly with problems
connected with the day-to-day operations of partnerships. Chapters
eight and nine speak to the dissolution, winding up, and liquidation or
partnerships. One detects in Professor Bromberg's statements a
sympathetic response to many of the ideas championed by Professor
Crane during the half-century that he was involved with partnership
law. Professor Bromberg feels almost as strongly as Professor Crane
that the entity theory of partnership law is more useful in a majority
of contexts than the aggregate theory. Such intellectual kinship is not
surprising, since Professor Crane had selected Professor Bromberg to
work with him on what originally was to have been a third edition of
the Crane text.
This book, nonetheless, is more than a revised edition of Crane
oln Partnership. The emphases of the two books often differ sharply.

For example, section 23B in the second edition of Crane on
Partnership, dealing with "choice of forms of organization," occupies
just over three pages. Professor Bromberg devotes fourteen pages of
highly structured, thoughtful material to this subject. Professor
Bromberg also gives considerably more attention to tax consequences,
although they are not fully developed, since full development would
not be in keeping with the primary purpose of the book.
In addition to changes in substantive emphasis in various
sections, there is a difference in the importance attached to statutes as
opposed to cases. Professor Crane devoted relatively little space in his
work to statutes other than the Uniform Partnership Act. Professor
Bromberg, on the other hand, pays a great deal of attention to
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, the Internal Revenue
Code, and particular state variants of the Uniform Partnership Act.
This emphasis is underlined by a very useful Table of Statutory
References, which follows the conventional table of cases.
There are also passages in which Professor Bromberg indicates a
healthy skepticism about the vehemence with which Professor Crane
spoke on various subjects. One such passage deals with the "jingle
rule," which Professor Crane criticized as "logically indefensible."
Professor Bromberg, while he notes the intellectual inconsistencies of
the rule, ends by saying, "one would be hard put to improve, in the
abstract, its approximate balance." For the most part, the text is
highly readable. For example, compare the following two passages:
In the United States, the term "joint adventure" is used to describe an
association for business purposes, not containing all the elements of partnership,
but so resembling it as to justify the application of some of the principles of
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partnership law. Joint adventure differs from partnership factually in the matter
of the extent of business undertaken.'
A joint venture (JV) or joint adventure is a business association
distinguishable from partnership (if at all) only by narrowness of purpose and
scope (p. 189).

The latter statement is Professor Bromberg's version, and one cannot
help being struck by the felicity of expression. At times, however, this
fluency has been impaired. For example, the following sentence appears
at one point in a discussion of tax problems:
Taking advantage of the Internal Revenue Code's broad definition of
corporation which includes association, some enterprising doctors formed (and
agreed to be employees of) associations which, by contract, had most of the
characteristics identified by the courts as corporate in earlier litigation subjecting
unwilling associations to corporate tax (p. 183).

Despite this occasional unevenness, the writing on the whole is clear.
By and large, the book seems well balanced. A considerable
portion of the work is spent on hard core fundamentals, as should be
the case with a treatise likely to be used extensively by students who
are searching for a means of untangling the web of cases confronting
them in their course books.
For all its good points, one is deeply grateful. Students have a
text available to them which is clear and coherent. There are,
however, certain features which one is tempted to criticize. This is
particularly true with regard to certain complex issues of unusual
conceptual difficulty, to which this book gives relatively scant
attention. Liability for fraud and misrepresentation, for example, is
disposed of in two paragraphs. Since determining appropriate
remedies for situations of this sort has long been a serious problem to
the courts, particularly where agency theories must be employed, this
hardly seems sufficient. Moreover, the mystifying situation in which
the Uniform Partnership Act has left us with regard to the relative
stance of a former partner, "old" partnership creditors, and "new"
partnership creditors is given no real resolution in the one short
passage that deals with it. Indeed, a reader might well pass through
this section without ever realizing that the problem exists. In view of
the tightly reasoned analysis of the problem available in a widely used
casebook, one finds this deficiency hard to forgive. Similarly
inadequate, it seems to this reviewer, is the very brief material
concerning intrapartnership indemnification in cases where partnership
assets have been used to satisfy liability incurred by the wrongful acts
of one partner (pp. 395-96).
I. J.

CRANE. LAW OF PARTNERSHIP

§ 35 (2d ed. 1952).
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One is even more disturbed by the failure of this text to seize on
the opportunity to criticize certain ambiguous, poorly phrased sections
of the Uniform Partnership Act. In particular the five pages on
partnership by estoppel offer very little in the way of suggested
alternatives for the verbal atrocity that now constitutes section 16 of
the statute.
It would be unfair, however, for a reviewer to offer these
criticisms without noting that they are defects far more significant to
scholars than to practitioners and that they are virtually unavoidable
in volumes written for the Hornbook series, in which exposition of the
law as it is and concentration on the problems most likely to recur
should be expected. Law review articles, briefs or monographs, and
participation in activities of law revision bodies are perhaps more
appropriate forms for concentration on these other matters.
Professor Bromberg has provided teachers, students and
practitioners with a text which serves very well the purposes of a short
text. Those interested in partnership law will find the book essential
reading.
ROBERT
*

N.

COVINGTON*

Associate Professor of Law and Faculty Advisor to the Law Review, Vanderbilt

University.

